Civil-Military Relations in Latin America:  The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited by Bruneau, Thomas C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2005
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: 
The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited
Bruneau, Thomas C.
þÿ R e v i s t a   F u e r z a s   A r m a d a s   y   S o c i e d a d   "   A ñ o   1 9   "   N º   1   "   2 0 0 5   "   p p .   1 1 1 - 1 3 1
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43105








Civil-Military Relations in Latin America:
The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited
Thomas C. Bruneau
Naval Postgraduate School, Estados Unidos
Resumen
El siguiente artículo  propone un nuevo enfoque hacia el estudio de las relaciones
civiles-militares. Su propósito es proporcionarle a los civiles en el poder legislativo
y ejecutivo conceptos e información que les ayude a cumplir con sus
responsabilidades lo mejor posible como funcionarios democráticamente electos.
Argumenta que estos civiles no necesitan saber tanto en el tema como los oficiales
militares, quienes saben mucho sobre “una cosa importante”. Basado en la
literatura académica y una amplia experiencia en Latinoamérica y otras partes del
mundo, el artículo sugiere que las relaciones civiles-militares se pueden
conceptualizar mejor como un terna de control civil, cumplimiento efectivo de
los papeles y misiones, y eficiencia para lograr los objetivos al menor costo posible.
Esta terna se puede lograr solamente por medio de la creación de instituciones
que incorporan y personifican conocimientos y mecanismos de control tanto del
poder ejecutivo como legislativo del estado democrático.
Palabras Clave: Relaciones civil-militares, fuerzas armadas, gobernabilidad y democracia.
Abstract
This article argues for a new focus in the study of civil-military relations.  It seeks
to provide civilian policymakers with ideas and information to help them best
carry out their responsibilities as democratically elected leaders.  Referring to
knowledge of military matters as “one big thing,” it argues that it is not necessary
for policymakers to know as much about matters of defense as their military
counterparts.  Based on the academic literature and the author’s experience in
Latin America and other regions, this article suggests that civil-military relations
are best understood in terms of  effectiveness, efficiency, and civilian control of
the armed forces.  These relations will only be effectively normalized when
institutions incorporate and personalize understanding and mechanisms of control
at both executive and legislative levels.
Keywords: Civil-military relations, Armed Forces, Governance and democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of 2005, a number of dramatic events have
occurred in Latin America which should have called our attention to the
perilous relationships between the democratically elected civilian
governments and their armed forces.  These events concern the power
relationships between democratically elected civilian presidents and the armed
forces. In a recent publication, David Pion-Berlin, one of the foremost
scholars writing in the field of civil-military relations in Latin America,
challenged the “current intellectual constructs” for conceptualizing this field
of  study.1  I fully agree with his call for new thinking about civil-military
relations, not only in Latin America but everywhere, and my goal in this
article is to provide a model to describe civil-military relations, and ways to
analyze different patterns in these relations. I will draw on the experiences
of Colombia and countries in Central America because they are similar in
terms of  the conflict and violence, and dissimilar in terms of  the longevity
of  democracy. Specific empirical cases will both illustrate the approach and
the possible path to useful analysis.2
The subtitle of  this article is taken from Aesop’s fable, which was made
famous most recently by Sir Isaiah Berlin’s brilliant essay on Leo Tolstoy
titled The Hedgehog and the Fox.  Berlin took as his point of  departure a line by
the poet Archilochus: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows
one big thing.” This suggests that, “The fox, for all of  his cunning, is defeated
by the hedgehog’s defense.”3  Like the fox, it occurs to me, democratically
elected politicians and governments must know many things, while the armed
forces in Latin America are like the hedgehog, for they know one big thing:
national security and defense.  After all, they spend their careers studying
about and training in these areas, they belong to institutions that focus almost
exclusively on them, and they ascend the ranks depending on their knowledge
and proficiency in preparing for war.  It is impossible for civilians, lacking
this background, to develop anything like the expertise of officers concerning
things military. Often, the officers will utilize a hedgehog strategy and
challenge the right of civilians to control the use of military power precisely
because of their lack of familiarity with these issues.
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I do not believe civilians need to be experts on these topics to do their
jobs.  They clearly must know something, and just as important, they must
be aware of  what they do not know, if  they are to be successful in utilizing
the armed forces and the more widely construed “security forces” to the best
advantage of their government and nation.  I thus disagree with Pion-Berlin
when he states that “…civilians do not have to worry about investing the
necessary time to understanding defense, strategy, tactics, preparation,
budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training.”4   In my opinion they must
know enough to be able to ensure that the armed forces are doing what they
are required to do, not only in terms of  submitting to civilian control (which
is Pion–Berlin’s main point), but also in successfully fulfilling the current
very wide spectrum of roles and missions assigned to the diverse security
forces in Latin America.  For this reason I will offer here a different approach
to civil-military relations whereby the foxes, i.e. civilians, can better
understand what the hedgehog knows—modern national security and
defense—and thus promote stronger relations between civilian government
leaders and military officials.
RECENT EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Since the beginning of 2005, a series of events have drawn attention
to the state of civil-military relations in Latin America.  Several of these
have to do with the traditional issues of  civilian control of  the armed forces
and access to power.  Others have more subtle implications, but they all
illustrate the broader challenges inherent in civil-military relations that I
will discuss later in this article.
Currently, at least three Latin American countries are experiencing major
public conflicts over control, or access to power, between civilians and the armed
forces.  In Nicaragua, President Enrique Bolanos and Minister of  Defense Jose
Adan Guerra have shown that they lack the power to force the armed services to
destroy about 1,000 Soviet-made portable anti-aircraft missiles.  The missiles,
left over from the civil war that ended in 1990, are maintained by foreign
technicians from the former Soviet Union, and in the hands of  terrorists would
pose a serious threat to global civil aviation.  In November 2004, President
Bolanos promised U.S. Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld that all of  the
missiles would be destroyed within eighteen months. In fact, U.S. Department
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of State spokesman Richard A. Boucher said, “President Bolanos of Nicaragua
had given assurances several times ‘that Nicaragua would destroy all of its man-
portable missiles in order to reduce the chance that they might fall into the
hands of  criminals and terrorists.’”5  Further, the armed forces are supported by
the Nicaraguan Congress, controlled by a coalition of  President Bolanos’s political
opponents, who consider themselves authorized to destroy the missiles.  Since
the Sandinistas are a major force in the Congress, as well as in the military, the
democratically elected president and the minister of defense are unable to
implement a promise they made to the United States.
In late April, a special session made up of opposition legislators in
Ecuador’s 100-seat Congress, bowing to the pressure of  escalating street
demonstrations, voted 62 to 0 to remove President Lucio Gutierrez, and
swore in Vice President Alfredo Palacio to replace him.  Admiral Victor
Hugo Rosero, chief  of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, announced immediately
that the military had withdrawn its support from Gutierrez. Less than a week
before, on 15 April, President Gutierrez had surrounded himself with the
armed forces commanders as he dissolved the Supreme Court and declared
a state of  emergency in Quito. When protests resulted, the army did not act
to restore order, and the president was forced to lift the state of  emergency.
The resulting congressional resolution that stripped him of power accused
the president of “abandoning his post.”  President Gutierrez, who had been
democratically elected in late 2002, refused to step down. “Finally, the army
hustled Mr. Gutierrez out of  the presidential palace.”6   The armed forces,
in short, acted as a power broker by withdrawing their support at a critical
moment, thereby allowing the congress to implement a clearly
unconstitutional change of  power.  Ironically, Gutierrez himself, when a
colonel in the Ecuadoran Army, had been part of  a junta that toppled the
government of  President Jamil Mahuad in January 2000, thus illustrating
the ongoing crisis in civil-military relations in Ecuador.7
In Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia, civil-military relations are
complicated by the fact that these new democracies are not yet consolidated.8
Colombia, by contrast, is one of the two or three oldest democracies in
115
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited
9 President Alberto Lleras Camargo in his speech to the top military officers at the Teatro
Patria on 9 May, 1958 clearly distinguished between the political and the military domains.
“When the Armed Forces enter into politics the first thing that is damaged is its unity,
because it opens up controversy in its ranks. … I do not want for the Armed Forces to
deliberate about how to govern the nation…. But, I do not want, by any means, that
politicians decide on how to manage the Armed forces, in their technical functions, in their
discipline, in their regulations, and in their personnel.”
10 See Veillette, Connie 9 May 2005. Plan Colombia: A Progress Report Congressional Research
Service, Washington, D.C.
11 For reporting on these events see Semana and   Cambio 4 June 2005 and El Espectador 1 June 2005.
Latin America, with elected governments since 1958 and a civilian-led
ministry of  defense since 1991.  What few outsiders appreciate, however, is
that there was a “deal” made at the time of the transition from military rule
in 1958 in which the civilians agreed to leave national security and defense
to the armed forces, and the armed forces would leave the rest of  government
and policy to the civilians.9   This would be a fair enough deal, except that
the armed forces showed themselves unable, or unwilling, to defeat an
insurgency that began in 1964, and became increasingly far-reaching, violent,
and well-financed through drug running, kidnapping, and extortion.
The United States became deeply involved in Colombia’s internal
conflicts in the 1980s, first through counter-drug strategies as part of
President Ronald Reagan’s “war on drugs,” then escalating with U.S.
military and financial support for Plan Colombia in the Clinton and Bush
administrations.  Post-9/11 counterterrorism funding brought the total U.S.
commitment to Colombia to $4.5 billion by mid-2005.10   With this high
level of  U.S. support, pressure increased on the civilians to deal with the
insurgency, and they in turn increased the pressure on the armed forces.
On 27 April 2005 Minister of  Defense Jorge Alberto Uribe, acting on
behalf of President Alvaro Uribe (the two are not related), fired four of
the six highest-ranking Army generals.  There were clearly many reasons
for this dramatic action, including the generals’ resistance to directions
that they operate jointly with the other services and the Colombian National
Police (PNC) in the counter-insurgency efforts.  There were also
disagreements with General Carlos Alberto Ospina, commander of the
military forces, over the loss of economic benefits that accrue to the highest-
level officers from their positions as defense attaches and in government-
run businesses.11  In short, once the Minister of  Defense in President Uribe’s
democratically-elected government attempted to exert actual control over
the Colombian Army in order to better use resources and achieve military
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The fired generals went to the media and denounced Minister Uribe
for “lacking moral authority and not having sufficient knowledge about
defense issues.”12  Thus the hedgehog reacted by accusing the fox of not
knowing the “one big thing,” even though the Colombian Army has failed
to show it knows enough even to force the insurgents to the negotiating
table, let alone win the war.13  As happened in Nicaragua and Ecuador, the
Colombian Congress began debating during the last week of May whether
to censure Minister of Defense Uribe for firing the generals. In short, while
on the surface civil-military relations appeared to be stable and democratic,
once civilians leaders put pressure on the Army to change in order to achieve
military success and better utilize resources, they encountered tremendous
resistance leading to the unprecedented action by Minister of Defense Uribe
and a reaction by the Congress to undercut him.
The above three cases demonstrate the continuing issues of control
and access to power in civil-military relations, as democratically-elected
civilians confront certain military “realities.”  Other cases could include Bolivia
and probably Paraguay, where the democracies are not consolidated and
the armed forces tend to be drawn into the political vacuum.  There are
several other sets of  issues involving civilians and the armed forces, however,
that are either new to the region or in some ways innovative.
Peacekeeping and peacemaking, know collectively as peace support
operations (PSO), are currently an integral part of the spectrum of roles and
missions of  armed forces throughout the world.  Argentina was the regional
leader in this area, with its own PSO training center. More recently, Brazil,
Chile, and Guatemala have made their first forays into what are termed
Chapter 7 operations under the United Nations Charter—that is,
peacemaking vs. peacekeeping—by sending troops to Haiti. Chile also has
established a PSO training center. And, in an initiative that can only be
explained by regional and global politics, Honduras and El Salvador sent
troops to support the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.  In fact, by February 2005,
El Salvador had deployed its fourth contingent of troops to Iraq.14   Both El
Salvador and Guatemala also are planning to establish PSO training centers.
All scholars who write on any aspect of PSO emphasize the critical civil-
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military component of these operations, not only at the top policy – making
levels where the ministries of foreign affairs have to work closely with the
ministries of defense, but also at the local levels where troops are constantly
interacting with local governments and non – governmental organizations
(NGOs).15  There is, in short, a new element of civil-military relations in
Latin America as increasing numbers of countries become involved in what
unfortunately promises to be a growth industry.
Even more unfortunately, many countries in the region have their
own internal crime problems that are extremely serious and threaten not
only the quality of life of millions of people but also the governability of
these new democracies. In addition to the enormous issues of  organized
crime and money laundering in the tri – border region (Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay), organized crime and narco-terrorism in Colombia, and money
laundering in Panama, there is the newer phenomenon of the “maras” or
gangs in Central America and Mexico.16  If  the new police forces were larger,
better trained, better funded, etc., the maras might not be an issue of civil-
military relations.  This is clearly not the case, however, in Guatemala and
Honduras where the presidents have ordered army troops out on the streets
to attempt to control the maras and to assert the presence of the state, albeit
weakly and haphazardly. In El Salvador, the army supports the National
Civilian Police, but elsewhere in the Central American region the issue is
really one of  the government using the armed forces.  Further, given the
recent history and challenges of the countries in the sub-region, crime is an
issue of national security that demands decisions from the top levels of
government, by the presidents themselves.
Finally, since 11 September 2001, even if  countries in the region
(except Colombia) had not been interested in counterterrorism, Washing-
ton has made it priority number one in international relations. As General
Bantz Craddock states in his SOUTHCOM Priorities and Investment Guidance:
War on Terrorism, “The #1 priority for this command is to prevent terrorist
groups from using the SOUTHCOM AOR as a staging ground to conduct
terrorist operations against the United States or our vital interests in the
Western Hemisphere, including partner nations throughout the region. We
must prepare, position and employ our resources in ways that enable us to
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detect, monitor, and, if  directed, interdict terrorist activities in our AOR.”17
Other countries throughout the region are very strongly encouraged to
strengthen their capabilities in intelligence and special operations, and to
cooperate and coordinate with each other and with the United States. These
again are civil-military issues, since both intelligence and special operations
forces are mainly run by the military, and decisions about their use are made
at the very highest levels of both the civilian and military hierarchies. While
there may not be much in the media on these issues of intelligence, special
operations, and coordination, anyone who visits these countries or attends
training courses with Latin American civilians and officers in the United
States and in the region itself should be aware that much is going on.
From this short summary of  some of  the highlights in contemporary Latin
American national security, defense, and civil-military relations it should be
obvious that civilians must be engaged, informed, and knowledgeable if  they
are to utilize scarce funds, personnel, and equipment to deal with one or more
of  the issues of  PSO, maras, and counterterrorism in the most effective ways.18
They really have no option, depending on the country, about being involved in
PSO if  they want other nations to take them seriously, or about fighting the
maras before these gangs take over even more of the cities, or having effective
intelligence to prevent terrorists from using their countries to stage attacks on the
United States. They have to act; how well they act, how well informed they
must be, is the real issue.  Nobody can expect civilians to become hedgehogs
and know everything about the “one big thing” that the officers spend their
careers studying and doing. Rather, as foxes, they have to know many things,
including some basic elements of national security and defense. This point is
obvious to me. The fact that it is not obvious to others, including one of the
foremost scholars in the field, suggests that I have a case to make.
DAVID PION-BERLIN AND POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF THE
MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA
In his recent article, “Political Management of  the Military in Latin
America”,  David Pion-Berlin argues somewhat polemically about what
civilian policymakers need to know in Latin America. He states that civilians
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“have no incentive to learn about defense.  Still, the military must be managed.
What Latin America needs are civilians who can manage the military in
political terms, not defense terms.  In this respect, Latin America is in better
shape than we might think, but we would never know that within the confi-
nes of current intellectual constructs.”19   In this section, I will outline some
of  Pion-Berlin’s basic arguments, and then in the following sections discuss
the validity of his premises in depth.  My purpose here is not to “take on”
Pion-Berlin, whose scholarly contributions I greatly respect, but rather to
“take off ” from his argument, and, I hope, to complement it.
Pion-Berlin suggests that civilian policy makers, today as in the past,
lack incentives to learn about defense.  He points out that historically, the
region was relatively unscathed by wars with external enemies, and that
currently ,“internal threats (narcotraffickers, terrorists, guerrillas) do not pose
challenges that warrant great military preparedness and sophistication.”
Further, he claims, “Latin America is not a region where politicians have
ever had or will ever have the incentive to get up to speed on defense issues,”
in terms either of  resources or employment.20   Pion-Berlin highlights the
contrast in competence between civilians and officers, by pointing out that,
“With defense perceived to be off-limits, civilians have never been able to
prove their worth. Instead, they have developed a kind of inferiority complex
that just reinforces their dependency on the military.”21   He concludes,
“Civilians have not and will not become sufficiently well versed on defense
matters anytime soon.  They will always have a significant knowledge deficit
because there is no incentive for them to learn defense.”22   He further
elaborates on disincentives for civilians to learn about defense, and states
that militaries themselves do not have many roles to play, but rather “occupy
rearguard positions, waiting for the occasional call to assist other forces.” 23
The lack of  civilian expertise is not such a big problem, however, because
“During the past two decades, while the balance of competence still tilts heavily in
favor of  the military, the balance of  power has moved in favor of  civilians.”24
Pion-Berlin lists measures governments have taken to bring the militaries under
civilian control, and contrasts the requirements in Latin America for civilian
control with other continents where the threats, demands, and payoffs are greater.
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He states that civilians must manage the military since it is both the coercive arm
of the state and a self-interested corporation whose needs must be addressed.
“Civilian leaders have managed the military, largely through a form of  political
civilian control, which is a low cost means of achieving a relative calm in civil-
military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise,
legislative oversight, and large budgets. This has been the modus operandi for the
majority of presidents and defense ministers in Latin America for some time.”25
He continues the argument on management, or control, by noting, “While
civilians interface, they do not intervene.  The government stays out of the
military’s defense sphere of  influence principally because of  its lack of  knowledge
and staff.  In virtually all Latin American governments, legislatures, and defense
ministries, there exists an overwhelming sense that the armed forces have a
near-monopoly on defense wisdom and that civilians’ deficit of military
knowledge can never be adequately overcome.”26
TAKING OFF FROM PION-BERLIN’S ARGUMENT
Widely accepted definitions of  democratic consolidation emphasize that
in a democracy, no area of  government can be excluded from the control of
elected civilian leaders.27   Accordingly, civilians cannot be absent from an area
of national governance as important as defense, “inferiority complex” or not.
The recent experiences in Ecuador and Nicaragua underline the fact that these
countries are not consolidated democracies.  The experience of  Colombia’s
democratically elected civilian leaders, who ran into solid opposition when they
decided to exert their authority, by contrast, should lead us to question our
assumptions about democratic consolidation even in this “historic democracy.”
While Latin America is indeed a relative “zone of peace” with regard to
external conflict, it is not peaceful internally, as illustrated by the gangs, or
maras, in Central America and Mexico, and drug traffickers, organized crime,
and insurgencies elsewhere.  Due to a lack of other instruments, such as
sufficiently large and professional police forces, civilian political policy makers
in Brazil, Mexico, and Central American states find themselves relying on the
armed forces to hold the front line against criminal gangs.  In most countries
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in the region, as well as in other parts of the world, the military also bears
responsibility for intelligence collection and analysis, the use of which then
can have a direct or indirect effect on the military’s roles and missions.
Civilian political leaders also direct the military to fulfill certain
international responsibilities short of  war, as illustrated by the involvement of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other Latin American
countries in peace support operations.  These roles and missions are not directly
related to national defense, but they rely mainly on the armed forces, and to
a lesser degree on gendarmerie and other police forces.  For example, a Brazilian
general officer heads up the UN Mission in Haiti, and has a Brazilian brigade
of 967 soldiers, including 245 Marines, deployed there.28
In short, the evidence shows that civilian policy makers not only manage
the armed forces, but also decide on their roles and missions, whether those
civilians want to or not and whether or not they are well informed.  The existence
of “inferiority complexes” therefore is mainly a matter of perception, and it is
for this reason that I use the metaphor of the hedgehog and the fox.  Civilian
policy makers do not need to know the “one big thing.”29  While they certainly
must know something, it is more important that they establish stable institutions
that embody and perpetuate the expertise needed to deal with possible roles
and missions as they arise. Only in this way can democratic governments deal
with problems and crises in a routine and internationally acceptable manner.
Building on Pion-Berlin’s emphasis on civilian control, and in order to
assist interested foxes to better understand what is involved in contemporary
national security and defense, and thus in civil-military relations, I will further
elaborate on a model for understanding civil-military relations.30  This model
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grows out of  my work at the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS CONCEPTUALIZED AS A TRINITY
Since 1994, CCMR has offered short courses on a wide variety of topics
dealing with all aspects of civil-military relations throughout the world.  In
Latin America, between 2003 and 2005, we offered programs involving 2,376
participants (674 civilians and 1702 military officers) from eighteen Latin
American and Caribbean nations. At CCMR we must respond to the customer,
in this case the Latin American civilian policymakers and military officers who
request our programs and then participate in them.  We do not have our own,
independent, funding; we must compete for different sources of funding with
a myriad of other government, non-governmental and for-profit organizations.
Once a program is agreed upon, we must again compete for the participation
of  the relevant civilian and military, current and future, policymakers.  In
short, CCMR works within an extremely competitive environment, which
forces us to respond to the priorities and concerns of the customers.  By
responding to the priorities of the policymakers in Latin America, we have
developed programs that address a wide range of  roles and missions (PSO,
counterterrorism, intelligence, humanitarian assistance, etc.), institutions
(ministries of defense, national security councils, legislatures, etc.), and
transparent processes (budgeting, contracting, acquisitions, etc.).
Based on the work of CCMR and also drawing from the general
literature on national security and defense and civil-military relations, I
propose that we conceptualize civil-military relations as a trinity: democratic
civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency.31   Fundamental to these
relations, rightly emphasized by Pion-Berlin, is democratic civilian control
of  the armed forces.  I will argue below, however, that for this control to
function as it should, it must be institutionalized along with the knowledge
needed to exercise intelligent control, not only developed in the person of
the minister of defense or her staff.
123
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited
32 The classic statement is Barnard, Chester. 1962 The Functions of  the Executive Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. A more recent discussion and utilization of the
concepts is Linz, Juan J. 1978. The Breakdown of  Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, &
Reequilibration Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
33 For this approach see my Introduction in Bruneau, Thomas and Tollefson, Scott, eds.
2006 Who Guards the Guardians, and How: Modern Civil – Military Relations University of  Texas
Press, Austin. (forthcoming.) The definition of  institutions, which is taken from the “New
Institutionalism” approach, is very broad and dynamic.
The relevant literature on effectiveness and efficiency uses these terms
inconsistently, therefore I will clarify what I mean by each of  them.32   By
effectiveness I mean that the armed services and other security forces are able in
fact to implement the roles and missions assigned to them by democratically
elected civilians.  Since there is a wide variety of roles and missions that
potentially can be assigned to the armed forces in Latin American, policymakers
must have sufficient knowledge to decide what tasks should be assigned and
how effective the military has been in fulfilling them.  Efficiency means that the
roles and missions are achieved at the least possible cost in lives and resources.
Because there are no simple mathematical formulae that define ‘least possible
cost,’ countries must have the institutions in place to determine priorities for
assigning some level of resources in money and personnel.  These bodies also
must have valid monitoring or oversight processes to ensure that the resources
go where they are intended.  In Latin America and elsewhere today, civil-
military relations are best conceptualized as this trinity.  The civilian
policymakers, the foxes, need to think beyond problems of control, and also
consider whether their forces can in fact achieve the roles and missions assigned
to them, and at what cost.  As there are never enough resources for everything,
these decisions will involve trade-offs, for example by making less available
for humanitarian assistance in trade for more involvement in PSO.
THE INSTITUTIONS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THE TRINITY
When we look at how different countries deal with the different elements
of  the trinity, we can identify four necessary sets of  structures and processes,
which I will here term “institutions” to emphasize their empirical nature vs.
a more conceptual, formalistic notion.33   After very briefly describing how
they support the trinity, I will discuss their presence or absence in Colombia
and some countries of Central America.
Ministries of Defense (MOD) may be created for several very
different reasons, but ultimately they can support all three elements of
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34 The literature on this topic is minimal. See for a review and argument the chapter on
MODs by Richard Goetze and myself, in Bruneau and Tollefson, ibid.
35 See the two chapters on global comparisons of  legislatures by Jeanne Giraldo in Bruneau
and Tollefson, ibid. See for the Defense Reorganization Act of  1986 Locher, James R.
2002. Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unified the Pentagon. Texas A & M Press,
College Station, Texas.
the trinity.34   Civilian policymakers can in fact control the armed forces
through the MOD bureaucracy.  Indeed, for this very reason the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization requires prospective members to have a
civilian-led MOD in place before they can join the organization.  The
MOD also typically will support military roles and missions, and evaluate
their effectiveness.  Finally, a cadre of  civilian and military lawyers,
economists, and accountants within the MOD will determine the
efficiency with which resources are being used.
Legislatures in established democracies, both presidential and
parliamentary, support all three elements of  the trinity.  They ensure
democratic civilian control by maintaining real separation of powers,
controlling the budget, and exercising oversight.  Diversity of political
representation through elections (not only, but especially in presidential
regimes), and the development of expertise among members and
particularly their staffs, allows legislatures to improve the effectiveness of
roles and missions.  The most dramatic example of this in the United
States was the Defense Reorganization Act of  1986, but there are cases
from Brazil and Argentina as well.  Furthermore, legislatures routinely
implement an oversight function through hearings, auditing units, and
inspectors general to ensure efficiency.  In fact, in most well-established
democracies their role in efficiency is probably greater than in
effectiveness.35
An established mechanism for inter-agency communication and
cooperation, whether situated in a national security council, or some other
executive-level organization such as Brazil’s Institutional Security Cabinet
(GSI), is a critical institution for the effectiveness element of  the trinity, in
the sense that I am using it here.  The inter-agency process is an element of
democratic civilian control but depends on other, more basic institutions,
such as a MOD, to influence effectiveness. It probably does not have much
impact on efficiency.  However, without any inter-agency process, there is
virtually no way for civilian leaders to determine roles and missions in any
logical manner. The phrase from Alice in Wonderland comes to mind here:
“If  you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there.”  In
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36 In Chile, with the current defense reform, the inter – agency process will be located in the
President’s Council of Ministers, or Cabinet.
37 For oversight and control see Lowenthal, Mark M. 2000 Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy CQ
Press, Washington, D.C.  I also have an edited book on intelligence reform and democracy
currently under review that includes all aspects of oversight and control.
most countries, civilian policymakers take up new roles and missions in an
ad hoc manner, without examining costs, benefits, and trade-offs, often because
of simple inertia.  Since national security and defense today span such a
wide spectrum of possibilities, a robust inter-agency coordinating process is
necessary for effectiveness.36
The intelligence system supports the first two elements of  the trinity.
Contemporary democracies maintain both fairly elaborate intelligence
systems that include military and civilian agencies, and very elaborate
mechanisms for exerting democratic control.  The methods of control often
include executive, legislative, judicial, and external (media and NGO)
elements.37   There is also much emphasis today on effectiveness of
intelligence, which is scrutinized through both executive and legislative
institutions.  There is not, however, any real effort to monitor efficiency in
any intelligence system that I am familiar with.  The emphasis on secrecy, in
collection, analysis and budgeting, does not allow for any true concern with
efficiency.
Table 1 below illustrates how these four institutional dimensions support
the three key elements of civil-military relations.
TABLE 1:
Institutional Bases for Trinity of  Democratic Civil-military Relations
MOD Legislature Inter-Agency Process Intelligence
Democratic Control X X X




38 Unfortunately, there is little written on these topics which is up to date. My assessments
here are based on multiple visits to all of the countries for CCMR seminars with civilian
and military policy –makers. For background see Williams, Williams P. and Walter, Knut.
1997. Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s Transition to Democracy University of
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
INSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR ACHIEVING THE TRINITY IN COLOMBIA
AND CENTRAL AMERICA
If we examine Colombia and Central America we find weaknesses in
terms of  the institutional bases for democratic civil-military relations.  This is
in contrast to the more established democracies, or even the newer democracies
in Eastern and Central Europe, where the pressure for reforms is tremendous
due to those countries’ desire to join NATO and the European Union.
Table 2 identifies institutional weaknesses in four Latin American
countries.
TABLE 2
Institutional Bases for the Trinity in Four Countries
The information in Table 2 suggests that there are variations from country
to country, and I will offer my tentative explanation for those variations in
the following section.38   It is important to emphasize that I am focusing on
the institutions that have been created to implement the trinity of civil-military
relations.  It is not a matter of whether President Berger in Guatemala can
fire generals and cut the defense budget, or whether President Uribe’s national
security advisor is a close personal friend without a staff.  The point is whether
institutions have been built both to provide stability and embed expertise to
deal with issues of national security and defense. I should note that three of
the countries are in some turmoil, and we must remember that it took many
years for Argentina and Chile to establish institutions along these four
dimensions.
MOD Legislature Inter-Agency Process Intelligence
  Colombia X X
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Colombia is making progress in reforming and strengthening its MOD
and intelligence system.39   The legislature, however, is almost totally absent
from national security and defense decision-making, and a MOD-president
relationship substitutes for an inter-agency process.  El Salvador is making
tremendous progress. While the MOD is still headed by an active-duty ge-
neral, there have been major reforms in all other areas. A sizeable group of
members and staff  in the congress are interested in and informed about
defense, there is a robust inter-agency process at least in counterterrorism,
while intelligence has recently been reformed as well.  In Guatemala, change
is imminent.  In the meantime the Guatemalan MOD is very weak, the
legislature is absent from participation in these issues, there is virtually no
inter-agency process, and intelligence seems to be ineffective and
uncontrolled.  Nicaragua’s development is also very rudimentary. There is a
civilian-led MOD, but it is weak, with a small staff  (in contrast to the army
which has ready access to power and resources).40   The legislature only
engages in these issues of national security and defense when it seeks to
oppose the President. There is no inter-agency process and intelligence still
lies mainly in the purview of  the army, and thus under control of  the
Sandinistas.
A PRELIMINARY EFFORT TO EXPLAIN VARIATIONS IN CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS
Even if other students of these issues might disagree with my
assessment, I am fairly sure there is agreement on the variations among
these countries and others in the region.  Here I would like to suggest
some possible lines of analysis to explain why we see such variation
among countries.  I suggest four main areas where scholars should focus
their analysis.
First, in accordance with many others scholars, including most of those
writing in the transitions-consolidation literature and democratic civil-
39 See Villamizar, Andres. 2004. La reforma de la inteligencia: Un imperativo democratico. Essayos de
Seguirdad y Democracia, Bogota. Also, Boraz, Steven C. 2005. “Controlling Intelligence
in Colombia: Advancing Democratic Consolidation in Latin America” International Journal
of  Intelligence and Counterintelligence Fall 2005 or Winter 2006. It should be noted that Minister
of  Defense Uribe resigned on 7 July. I continue to believe that the MOD itself  is being
reformed, but the point of departure was very basic.
40 While finishing this article I received an e mail from my friend, Jose Adan Guerra, the
Minister of  Defense, that he had resigned as of  10 June 2005.
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military relations, I agree that we must first look at the terms and
understandings of  the transitions to democracy, and the prerogatives
accruing to the armed forces.41   This applies as well to the simultaneous
peace and democratization processes that took place at the end of the civil
wars in Central America, which included explicit terms for civil-military
relations.  Politics has a way of  taking on its own momentum, however,
and the terms of  the transitions and ancillary brokered agreements can
and do change.42
The second focal point is international involvement and influence.
This factor was important in El Salvador and Guatemala, and somewhat
less important in Nicaragua, where the U.S. was initially heavily
involved and then, for a variety of largely domestic political reasons
adopted a policy of benign neglect. It includes bilateral relations,
primarily but not only with the United States (Great Britain for example
is involved in Guatemalan civil-military relations), the United Nations,
and the many NGOs that are present in Colombia and Guatemala.
There is nothing in the region equivalent to the influence of  NATO
and the EU, however, which lay down explicit and detailed rules for
democratic civil-military relations among other things, as prerequisites
for nations that want to acquire the benefits of membership in these
organizations.
Third, we have found that issues in civil-military relations, at least
in countries that were formerly under military control, will be addressed
only when the government is sufficiently stable and coherent to be able
in fact to govern.  This was the case in Portugal for thirteen years after
the revolution, and is the case today in Guatemala and Nicaragua,
though Guatemala, under President Berger, is showing some progress.
Both Argentina and Brazil struggled with the most difficult phase of
civil-military relations, which is reform of  the intelligence system.
41 While suggesting other factors in the last paragraph of  his chapter, Aguero really looks
only to the transition – consolidation in a recent chapter. See Aguero, Felipe. 2001.
“Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Post-
authoritarian Regimes” in Pion-Berlin, David. Civil – Military Relations in Latin America: New
Analytical Perspectives University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.
42 See, for example, Hunter, Wendy. 1997. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against
Soldiers University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.
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Therefore, until Guatemala and Nicaragua can become more stable
politically, progress in the trinity is likely to remain tentative.43
Fourth, political learning is an important but imprecise concept, and
difficult to quantify.44   At a minimum, we can envision leaders learning
about civil-military relations in MODs as well as a variety of educational
institutions and think tanks.  The College for Higher Strategic Studies (CAEE)
in El Salvador has an impressive eleven-year record of educating civilians
and officers who will eventually work together in the executive and legislature.
There is a similarly successful organization, the National Defense College
(CDN), in Honduras.  Nicaragua unfortunately has no such institution, while
the myriad of NGOs and think tanks in Guatemala, seem beholden to foreign-
influenced agendas rather than those coming from within Guatemalan society.
One of the biggest problems in Colombia was the total absence of a think
tank, university program, or NGO focused on national security and defense,
and civil-military relations.  Today the think-tank Fundación Securidad y Demo-
cracia, which is stimulating and informing a debate on national security and
defense issues, seems to be having a positive impact on political learning in
Colombia.
CONCLUSION
David Pion-Berlin encourages us to challenge “current intellectual
constructs” in civil-military relations in Latin America. I have done so
here by adding two other elements to civil-military relations beyond
democratic control—effectiveness and efficiency.  Considering the very
large spectrum of  roles and missions that Latin American armed forces
are currently engaged in, it seems only logical that civilian policymakers
43 This sense of the weakness of an unstable government to deal with the military in
Nicaragua is captured well by Villarreal, Margarita Castillo 2005. “Nicaragua: Civilians
and Military After the Sandinista Revolution.” Military Review March – April. “When
Nicaragua is socially, politically, and economically stable, perhaps the army will cede
more autonomy to civilian authorities.” Guatemalan political instability and government
ineffectiveness are highlighted in The World Bank. 9 March 2005. Guatemala Country Economic
Memorandum (CEM): Challenges to Higher Economic Growth The World Bank, Washington,D.C.
p. 71, which ranks Guatemala near the bottom of the world in terms of these indicators.
44 Among other useful sources see the following. McCoy, Jennifer L. ed. 2000. Political Learning
and Redemocratization in Latin America: Do Politicians Learn from Political Crises? North- South
Center Press, Miami, Florida; Cohen, Michael D. and Sproull, Lee S. eds. Organizational
Learning Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA; and, Bermeo, Nancy 1992. “Democracy
and the Lessons of Dictatorship.” Comparative Politics April, pp. 273-291.
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possess a bare minimum of knowledge about national security and defense.
They do not have to become hedgehogs, but they must become familiar
with the relevant issues. Most importantly, they need to build institutions
whereby the expertise and processes needed for intelligent decision-making
can become embedded.  All of this is possible through political learning
from other nations’ experiences, education and training programs, and
the rapidly – expanding literature on these topics.
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